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ABSTRACT: This article attempts to measure the impact of India’s
limited liberalization on the seed industry and on farmers. Using a
unique data set on the structure, research, and sales of private seed ﬁrms
at two points in time, 1987 and 1995, we provide evidence that
liberalization increased the competitiveness of the seed industry, and
increased the amount of research by Indian and foreign seed ﬁrms.
Then, using government district level data and data collected from these
ﬁrms, we show that private hybrids increased farmers’ yields. This
suggests that Indian farmers are the true beneﬁciaries of liberalization
and that policies that encourage more competition and more research
will provide future beneﬁts to farmers.
INTRODUCTION
India has reformed its technology policy as part of its liberalization process of the
late 1980s and 1990s. In the seed industry, the government launched a New Seed
Industry Development Policy in 1988 that was supposed to encourage the private
sector to play a larger role in the seed industry. However, some groups in Indian
society are now arguing that reforms have gone too far in the agricultural sector.
They raise the specter of foreign corporations using terminator genes to starve
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ISSN: 1096-7508 All rights of reproduction in any form reservedpoor Indian farmers with seed that will not germinate. So far, there has been little
quantitative evidence of the impact of reform on the Indian input industry and
Indian farmers.
This article attempts to start to correct that situation by analyzing quantitative
data on the impact of reform in a key agricultural input industry—the seed
industry. The ﬁrst section summarizes the structure of the seed industry and the
policies that government is including in the recent reforms in the seed industry.
The second section examines the quantitative evidence on the impact of reforms
on seed industry structure and R&D by the seed industry using 1987 and 1995
data from surveys of the seed industry. The third section presents the ﬁrst
econometric evidence that the private hybrids have had a positive impact on
farmers’ yields. The fourth section suggests further policy reforms that are needed
in the seed industry.
SEED INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND POLICY REFORM
The main source of seed for most Indian farmers is still farmer-saved seed. About
10% of the seeds of self-pollinated crops such as rice and wheat are supplied by
the commercial seed system; the other 90% is farmers’ saved seed. Twelve
percent of all the seed planted in India is provided by the commercial seed system
(Agrawal, 1997). Even when they plant hybrids, maize farmers still use over a
third of their own seed despite the loss in yields because of planting second
generation hybrids (Singh and Morris, 1997).
Seed production and marketing are done by both state seed corporations (SSCs)
and private seed ﬁrms. Most of the seed distributed by both public and private
seed ﬁrms is grown by thousands of small farmers on contract with SSCs or
private ﬁrms. Some of the seed for SSCs is produced by a few large government
farms. Seed is processed and packaged by the SSCs and private ﬁrms. Seed
imports are negligible except for vegetable seed.
Industry representatives estimate that from 1984 to 1995, 50% to 60% of the
value of seed was sold by the private sector (Chopra K. R. President, Seed
Association of India, personal communication May, 1989; Agrawal, 1997). The
Seed Association of India reports that private ﬁrms have the largest share of the
commercial market of maize, sunﬂower, pearl millet, and sorghum sudan grass
(personal communication, R. S. Arora, President Seed Association of India, letter
to authors of November 1, 1996). Private ﬁrms also make up an important and
growing share of the cotton and sorghum hybrid market. SSCs dominate the wheat
and rice seed sales.
Research to produce new varieties is primarily conducted by the Indian Council
of Agricultural Research (ICAR) institutes, State Agricultural Universities
(SAUs), and International Agricultural Research Centers such as ICRISAT. ICAR
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1994 (Singh et al., 1996). Our survey found that the private sector spent about Rs.
155 million (U.S. $4.4 million) on plant breeding research.
The Indian government has intervened extensively in seed markets since the
colonial period. The British established a system of testing new varieties,
multiplying small amounts of those varieties on seed farms, and distributing seed
of new varieties through the extension system. After Independence, the ﬁrst major
government seed industry initiative was to establish the National Seed Corpora-
tion and State Seed Corporations to meet the demand for seed caused by the Green
Revolution in the 1960s. The ﬁrst seed law was passed in 1966.
Restrictions on private seed ﬁrms started in the late 1960s. The Government of
India banned commercial imports of any agricultural input that was also being
produced in India. This applied to seeds of ﬁeld crops, which could only be
imported by the government, and vegetable seeds, which could be imported by
private ﬁrms with special permission from the government. The government also
restricted exports of seeds. The 1969 Industrial Policy Act restricted Indian ﬁrms
that had more than Rs.1 billion in assets to “core” industries. In 1979, ﬁrms which
had more than 40% foreign equity were also restricted to core industries.
The seed industry was not a core industry. Therefore, large Indian ﬁrms and
ﬁrms with more than 40% foreign ownership were not allowed to enter the
industry.
India reduced barriers to the entry of foreign ﬁrms and large Indian companies,
and reduced regulations on importing new agricultural technology starting in the
mid 1980s. The key reforms were: (1) seed and biotechnology industries were
included in the list of core industries in 1986, which allowed foreign-owned ﬁrms
and large Indian conglomerates to enter the seed industry; (2) the New Seed
Industry Development Policy of 1988 allowed seed ﬁrms to import commercial
vegetable seeds with no quotas, to import commercial seeds of foreign varieties
of coarse grains and oilseeds for only two years (after which seed ﬁrms had to
produce the seed inside India), and made it easier to import germplasm for
research purposes; and (3) in 1991, regulations on technology transfer and foreign
investment for the entire economy were reduced.
IMPACT OF REFORM ON THE SEED INDUSTRY
There is general agreement that reform allowed more foreign ﬁrms and more large
Indian ﬁrms to enter the seed industry. But did they affect the amount of research?
Did these reforms lead to increased imports of seed? Are foreign ﬁrms controlling
the Indian seed industry? Have these changes increased or reduced competition in
the seed industry?
The empirical bases of our analysis are surveys of seed ﬁrms conducted in 1988
Liberalization’s Impact on the Indian Seed Industry 409and 1996. The 1996 data were collected through a May 1996 mail survey of
private seed ﬁrms. Questionnaires were sent out to approximately 160 seed
companies that either had links with the International Crops Research Institute for
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), were members of the Seed Association of
India, or were identiﬁed by other ﬁrms. In all, 51 companies responded to the
survey with information on these issues. These 51 included almost all of the major
seed ﬁrms, accounting for about 75% of private commercial seed sales and 38%
of public and private seed sales in India. ,This calculation is based on total sales
by the ﬁrms in our sample of Rs.3600 million, and Seed Association of India
estimates of total commercial seed sales of Rs.10000 million in 1994 (Arora,
1996) of which about half were by the private sector.. In addition, we draw from
a 1988 survey using a similar methodology which got responses from 28 ﬁrms
including all the large private ﬁrms that were active in the mid 1980s (Pray et al.,
1991). The data from these surveys are supplemented with government data when
appropriate and available.
The changes in seed policies and regulations had very little impact on seed
trade. Seed imports are negligible except in vegetables (Government of India,
1996). Sunﬂower is the only ﬁeld crop with appreciable imports of commercial
seed in recent years, and that was only for one year, 1991 through 1992. Even that
was only about 7% of total commercial use. The volume of imports of vegetable
seed, for which restrictions on trade were eliminated except a small tariff,
increased much more than ﬁeld crops. Seed exports were also very limited. Small
quantities of maize, forage crops, and vegetable seeds are exported from time to
time.
Reforms led to greater competition in the industry. After the 1986 change in the
Industry Act allowed large Indian ﬁrms into the seed industry, J. K. Industries,
SPIC (Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation), Khatau–Junker Ltd.,
Godrej, Dunlop, and Harrisons entered the Indian seed industry for the ﬁrst time.
The last three soon dropped out. In addition, large, well-established ﬁrms that
were partially foreign-owned such as Hindustan Lever Ltd.(HLL), ITC, ICI, and
Sandoz also entered the seed industry. The other key group of new entrants was
the multinational seed companies such as Cargill, DeKalb, and Monsanto, who
generally came in as joint ventures or wholly own research or foundation seed
companies with local distributors. The ﬁnal group of new entrants was small seed
companies.
The effect of these entrants was to reduce concentration and increase the
competitiveness of the industry. The top half of Table 1 documents this impact.
The number of ﬁrms that responded to our surveys almost doubled (Row 2, Table
1), but even more importantly the number of larger ﬁrms with research programs
doubled. While the total number of ﬁrms in the sample is not a reliable measure
of the growing number of ﬁrms in the industry, the number of research ﬁrms is.
These ﬁrms are well known to ICRISAT and the seed industry, and with some
410 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001extra work we were able to get questionnaires back from all of them in the both
surveys. The new entrants included companies with substantial amounts of capital
and large rural distribution networks (SPIC and JK had fertilizer distribution
networks, HLL distributed consumer products, ICI and Sandoz distributed
pesticides), and biological research programs (HLL, Sandoz, and ICI). Many
small companies entered the industry selling public hybrids and varieties. The
effect has been less concentration in the seed market as measured by the standard
measure—the four ﬁrm concentration ratio—that went from 69% of private sales
in 1987 to 51% of private sales in 1995 (see Table 1).
Multinationals or large Indian companies have greatly increased their share of
the market but have not been able to dominate the industry. As the table shows,
the large Indian companies went from nothing to a 23% share of the private
market, while ﬁrms with some foreign ownership went from 10% to 33% of the
private market. Because government corporations’ sales are about equal to private
sales, the share of the four largest ﬁrms in the total commercial market is about
25%. Assuming the commercial market is about 12% of all seeds used by farmers,
the four largest ﬁrms supplied 3% of total seed used.
IMPACT OF REFORM ON RESEARCH
Between 1987 and 1995 the real expenditure on research conducted by the private
sector increased from Rs.41.7 million to Rs.154.9 million (bottom of Table 1).
The number of researchers with Ph.D.’s went from 31 to 111. The number of
research scientists with M.Sc.’s increased from 45 to 140, and the area under
experiment stations from over 400 to over 1,200 hectares. The number of ﬁrms
conducting research increased from 17 to 38.
How much of that increase is because of reform? Economic theory suggests
that, in addition to policy changes, major factors inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ research
investment decisions are expected sales of the product of R&D, the ability to
capture the beneﬁts of research through intellectual property rights or technical
Table 1. Size and Structure of the Private Seed Industry 1987 to 1995
1987 1995
Number of companies in responding to survey 24 51
4 ﬁrm concentration ratio (% private sales by top 4 ﬁrms) 68 51
Share of large (MRTP) Indian companies (% of private sales) 0 23
Share of ﬁrms with foreign ownership (% of private sales) 10 33




Area of Experiment Stations (ha) 408 1503
R&D Expenditure (mil. 1995 Rs.) 41.7 154.9
Sources: Pray et al. (1991) and Pray and Kelley (1998).
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the reforms in increasing research it is necessary to examine the impact of these
other factors.
Of the 47 ﬁrms for which we have information, 20 ﬁrms entered the industry
after 1987. They account for about 44% of the increase in R&D expenditures
between the two surveys. Of these 20 ﬁrms, ﬁve ﬁrms would not have been
allowed entry into the industry under the old policies– that is, they were either
large domestic ﬁrms or foreign ﬁrms. The R&D budgets of the ﬁve foreign and
large domestic ﬁrms that entered the industry since 1987 adds up to nearly 36%
of the increase in R&D.
We now turn to examining whether reforms had a role in (1) inducing the entry
of the 15 small Indian ﬁrms and (2) the expansion of R&D budgets of the
incumbent ﬁrms.
The small Indian ﬁrms primarily conduct pearl millet and sorghum plant
breeding research –crops in which public research programs are strong, and the
market for hybrid seed was increasing. Thus, the spurt of entry and research by
small ﬁrms may well have been more closely related to the opportunities thrown
up by the growing market for hybrids, and opportunities provided by public
research than by seed policy reform.
In 1995, incumbent ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms that were in the industry before 1987)
accounted for 61% of total R&D expenditure. The increase in the budgets of
incumbent ﬁrms amounts to 54% of the increase in industry R&D budget. Was
this expansion related to seed policy reforms or was it simply higher sales which
led ﬁrms to expect even higher sales in future on proprietary hybrids? If future
sales are a projection of current sales, we can control for this factor by comparing
the ratio of R&D expenditures to current sales across the two surveys. This ratio
was 3.6% in 1987 and 6.9% in 1995. In 1995, these ﬁrms almost doubled their
R&D expenditure ratio, which indicates that higher sales were not the only
important factor in their growth.
The second factor that may have caused an increase in R&D expenditures was
the development of hybrids for rice and rapeseed. Between 1987 and 1995, it
became clear that hybrid rice and rape/mustard were commercially feasible.
Hybrids can enhance the private returns to research investments because seed
from hybrids cannot be used repeatedly without signiﬁcant quality deterioration.
All of the private research by the seed industry was on crops for which production
of F1 hybrids is possible (Table 2). In 1995, hybrid rice was the subject of
research by 15 companies; in 1987, no companies were doing hybrid rice
breeding. Only one private company had mustard and rapeseed research programs
in 1987; now at least nine ﬁrms do. To control for this effect in the incumbent
ﬁrms, we delete the R&D expenditures on rice and rapeseed from the total in
1996, and then compare the ratio of the resulting magnitudes to sales between the
two periods. Now the growth is from 3.6% to 5.2%—still a considerable increase.
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stimulated research in the incumbent ﬁrms, but no data are available to test its
impact. Advances in biotechnology had stimulated some limited research invest-
ments by 1995. The SPIC Science Foundation has had a rice biotechnology
research program for a number of years. It is loosely linked to SPIC’s seed ﬁrm.
Proagro established a biotechnology laboratory in Gurgaon, near Delhi, which had
three Ph.D. scientists working with transgenic mustard and vegetables in 1995.
MAHYCO was just starting to invest in biotechnology research.
Other less dramatic advances in science have also been important sources of
technological opportunity. The Indian public research system has made major
contributions of inbred lines, germplasm, and breeding techniques in rice,
sorghum, pearl millet, cotton, and sunﬂower. ICRISAT has made contributions of
germplasm and techniques in pearl millet, and sorghum. IRRI is responsible for
developing tropical male sterile lines and restorers that were the basis for India’s
hybrid rice, and CIMMYT contributed to the maize germplasm used by private
breeders (Singh et al., 1995). ICRISAT produced the world’s ﬁrst pigeon pea
hybrid in 1992, and private seed companies have been fast to follow in producing
their own.
To document the importance of public research to private ﬁrms, we asked ﬁrms
to rate the importance of various sources of breeding material. Firms’ ratings of
the importance of various sources of germplasm support the importance of the
Indian public sector and international centers, and to private sector breeders.
Table 3 shows the percentage of ﬁrms that rated a source of germplasm as “very
important.” ICRISAT is reported to be very important by 65% and 80% of the
sorghum and millet breeding ﬁrms, respectively. ICAR/SAUs are very important
for 66% of the cotton breeders, and joint venture partners are the most important
outside source of sunﬂower breeding material. The importance of ICRISAT may
have been overstated. The survey was sent out from ICRISAT, and the users of






1987 1995 1987 1995
Sorghum 10 27 7 21
Pearl Millet 12 30 8 20
Maize 6 24 4 23
Sunﬂower 10 26 7 21
Cotton 9 27 4 27
Mustard 1 9 1 10
Rice 0 15 0 16
Others 9 20 9 16
Total 17 38 40 155
Source: Same as Table 1.
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a way that was favorable to ICRISAT.
We conclude that reform was a very important factor accounting for the
increase in private research in India. Thirty-six percent of the increase was by
ﬁrms that could not have entered the industry without the reforms. Much of the
increase in research by the incumbent ﬁrms is also because of reforms. The
competitive pressure of new entrants that have major research programs forced
local ﬁrms to invest more in research to remain competitive. In addition, greater
ability to appropriate the gains from research because of the development of rice
and mustard/rapeseed hybrids accounted for up to 20% of the increase. Finally,
developments in biotechnology and conventional public sector breeding also
encouraged growth in private research.
IMPACT OF PRIVATE RESEARCH ON FARMERS
The increase in private research by the seed industry concentrated on a few crops
which, in order of expenditure on research, were cotton, maize, sunﬂower,
sorghum, pearl millet, hybrid rice, rapeseed-mustard, and others. The primary
goal of most private plant breeding research in India has been to increase yields
while ensuring that the new varieties are not susceptible to pests and disease, and
are of at least equal quality of the current varieties. This section attempts to
measure how well ﬁrms have succeeded in increasing yields, and how much of the
beneﬁts the seed ﬁrms were able to capture.
Yields
The increase in private research led to an increase in the area under private
hybrids. Our data on district level area under private hybrids based on estimates
by six of the largest private ﬁrms is the ﬁrst published estimate of district level
area under private hybrids. The results in Table 4, columns two and three, show
that the area under private hybrids increased in all states for which data are
available. In Andhra, the percentage under private pearl millet and sorghum
Table 3. “Very Important” Sources of Breeding
Material for Four Crops (% of ﬁrms which said
source was very important)
Sorghum Pearl Millet Sunﬂower Cotton
ICRISAT 65 80 na na
ICAR/SAU 29 34 0 66
Parent/JV 23 9 33 3
Foreign Co. 0 3 11 0
Other Indian Co. 10 0 22 66
Own collection 53 49 63 10
Source: Pray and Kelley (1998).
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percentages in Karnataka doubled, as did the share of private hybrid sorghum in
Maharashtra. According to government statistics, yields increased in these states
also (columns 1 and 2 of Table 4). Thus, it is possible that the private hybrids led
to increases in yields.
The empirical model for our partial productivity analysis is similar to the model
of total factor productivity analysis in the literature (Evenson et al., 1999). The
independent variables in our analysis include a measure of the spread of high
yielding varieties expressed as a proportion of the crop area devoted to all
varieties (PHYV). This variable is taken to be a proxy for past public research
expenditures, but it also includes area under private hybrids of maize, sorghum,
and pearl millet. Additional variables include a measure of the spread of private
varieties (PVT), the proportion of crop area that is irrigated (PIR), the fertilizer
use in the entire district (N), the number of regulated markets in the district
(MARKETS), the length of roads in the district (ROADS), a measure of
proﬁtability of the crop (ARP), a trend variable (YEAR), and variables measuring
rainfall in June (JUNE), July and August (JULAUG) and for the entire year
(ANNUAL). In the language of the Evenson, Pray and Rosegrant article, the
Technology variables are HYV and PVT, the Infrastructure variables are
irrigation, fertilizer use, markets, and road length while the trend and the rainfall
variables are the “Other” variables.
Included here and not found in the literature is a proxy for crop-speciﬁc
proﬁtability. This is derived as a three-year moving average of the harvest price
(deﬂated by the index of manufacturing prices). The rationale for including it is
that it would be highly correlated with variable input use (including labor) for
which we have no crop-speciﬁc data. The basic model is augmented by interaction
variables of PHYV with PVT, irrigation and fertilizer use, and of PVT with
irrigation and fertilizer use. Although much of the literature chooses a double-log














Sorghum, Andhra Pradesh 9 29 .64 (120) .74 (100)
Sorghum, Karnataka 29 46 .87 (98) 1.04 (60)
Sorghum, Maharashtra 8 18 .91 (133) 1.0 (111)
Pearl Millet, Andhra Pradesh 10 33 .68 (103) .8 (83)
Pearl Millet, Karnataka 10 24 .48 (69) .54 (44)
Pearl Millet, Maharashtra 34 42 .45 (120) .63 (97)
Maize, Andhra Pradesh 50 74 1.67 (114) 2.48 (92)
Maize, Karnataka 33 61 2.5 (103) 2.82 (70)
Maize, Maharashtra 25 30 1.04 (126) 1.31 (111)
Notes: Figures in ﬁrst two columns are based on estimates by private seed ﬁrms. Data in last two columns for a state are averages across
districts and years. The ﬁgures in parentheses are the number of observations. They differ from variable to variable because of missing
observations.
Liberalization’s Impact on the Indian Seed Industry 415functional form, we report the results for a linear model because in model
selection tests the double-log form was rejected relative to the linear model. The
analysis uses standard pooling techniques of estimation.
Our analysis covers maize, sorghum, and pearl millet. Because private varieties
have been signiﬁcant in these crops only recently, our analysis is conﬁned to the
period from 1985 onwards. Table 4 records the growth in the share of area under
private hybrids between the years 1990 and 1995. We observe large increases in
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, whereas more modest increases are seen in
Maharashtra. The last two columns of Table 4 record the change in average
district yields between the periods 1985 through 1990, and 1991 through 1995. In
all cases, average district yields have increased. It is natural to ask, therefore,
whether the increases in yields were associated with greater adoption of private
hybrids. Our objective is to examine whether variation in area under private
hybrids is a signiﬁcant determinant of the variation in average district yields.
Informed and rational agents would, of course, not adopt an innovation unless it
makes them better off. We are not therefore attempting to test whether yields of
private hybrids are higher than currently grown cultivars. Rather our goal here is
to test for the inﬂuence of private hybrids on the overall rise in crop yields.
For our analysis, we used government data on various district level ﬁgures such
as yields, fertilizer use, adoption of high yielding varieties, infrastructure
availability, and weather. These data were supplemented by a variable measuring
the proportion of crop area under private hybrids. This information was obtained
by eliciting estimates from private seed companies. Because private hybrids have
been signiﬁcant in these crops only recently, our analysis is conﬁned to the period
since 1985.
The regression analysis analyzed private hybrids by individual crops and states.
Table 5 provides an example—a maize regression in Maharashtra. Table 6
summarizes the results of the regressions. Private hybrids’ impact on yields is
positive, and statistically signiﬁcant in 5 of the 9 crops and provinces, and close
to signiﬁcant in a 6th case. In addition, the HYV variable is statistically signiﬁcant
in 4 of the 9 regressions. These estimates provide ﬁrst econometric evidence that
we know of in which private hybrids have had a positive impact on crop yields in
developing countries. This is particularly impressive because the region examined
is in the semiarid tropics, where private research is not expected to have much
impact. In addition, the results support the continued importance of the public
sector research which is producing the HYVs.
Maize and sunﬂower are the crops that should be most important to private
foreign research because multinationals and local ﬁrms can draw on large research
programs on these crops in temperate regions of the world. The private maize
variable is positive in all three states, and is signiﬁcant in Maharashtra and Andhra
Pradesh. In Karnataka, the impact of private varieties is not signiﬁcantly different
from zero. The HYV variable is signiﬁcant.
416 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 3/4/2001Interviews with seed companies suggest that sorghum and pearl millet have not
beneﬁted much from recently imported germplasm, but have beneﬁted from
private breeding based on strong public research programs. Thus, one might
expect to see private and HYVs statistically signiﬁcant. What we found was that
both were positive and signiﬁcant in sorghum in Karnataka, and close to
signiﬁcant in sorghum in Maharashtra. Elsewhere the results were mixed.
Table 5. Maharashtra: Maize Yield
Function
Continuous Private Variable
Private Varieties .04 (3.3)
HYV .13 (.96)
Irrigation 2.14 (.99)




Rainfall, July-August 2.001 (3.20)
Rainfall, June 2.0005 (1.3)
Rainfall, Annual .0007 (3.24)
Trend 2.006 (.21)
Number of Observations 191
Number of Districts 24
R square 0.27
Fixed Effects
Table 6. Summary of Impact of Private and Public
Hybrids on Yields
Crop & State PVT HYV Estimation Technique
Sorghum, Andhra Pradesh .0027* 2.09 Random Effects
(1.92) (1.54)
Sorghum, Karnataka .0083** .44** Random Effects
(2.34) (2.99)
Sorghum, Maharashtra 0.008 .23* Fixed Effects
(1.54) (1.88)
Pearl Millet, Andhra 0.0007 2.084 Fixed Effects
Pradesh (.27) (1.1)
Pearl Millet, Karnataka 2.0002 .39** Random Effects
(.11) (3.2)
Pearl Millet, Maharashtra .01* .02 Fixed Effects
(1.91) (.32)
Maize, Andhra Pradesh .023** 2.11 Fixed Effects
(2.27) (.7)
Maize, Karnataka .005 .77* Random Effects
(.48) (1.7)
Maize, Maharashtra .04** .13 Fixed Effects
(3.33) (.96)
t-values in parentheses. *Denotes estimates signiﬁcant at the 10% level and **denotes estimates signiﬁcant at the
5% level.
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Many people argue that the only beneﬁciaries of plant breeder rights, hybrid
seed, or plant biotechnology will be the seed companies and Life Science
companies, not farmers. This does not make much sense unless you believe that
Indian farmers are so irrational or misinformed that they would adopt a
technology that does not give them any beneﬁt. Nevertheless, it seems useful to
look at the quantitative evidence that is available. It supports the argument that
Indian farmers are rational and are adopting proprietary hybrids because they, not
the seed companies, capture most of the beneﬁts.
The only study that has looked at how the beneﬁts of private hybrids were
divided in India is Pray et al. (1991). In 1986 and 1987, yields of private pearl
millet and sorghum hybrids were higher than public hybrids and public open
pollinated varieties in the All India Coordinated yield trials run by ICAR and in
farmers ﬁelds. In the ICAR pearl millet trials, a MAHYCO private hybrid, MBH
110, out-yielded the check hybrid, BJ 104, by an average of 23%, and yields of
Pioneer hybrids were 7% to 10% higher than MBH 110. In the ICAR sorghum
trials, yields of private hybrids were approximately 15% higher (AICSIP and
AICMIP 1987 and 1988). Farm level yields from surveys carried out by ICRISAT
and Rutgers University in nine districts of Maharashtra and Gujarat found similar
yield increases in 1986 and 1987.
Seed prices were considerably higher for private hybrids than for public
hybrids or varieties. Farmers paid Rs.28/kg for private pearl millet hybrids
compared to Rs.12/kg for public hybrids, and Rs.7/kg. for public varieties.
Farmers paid Rs.24/kg for private sorghum hybrids, Rs.14/kg for public hybrids,
and Rs.5/kg for public varieties. Nevertheless, the value of increases in farmers’
yields of hybrid sorghum and pearl millet greatly outweighed the increase in cost
of seeds. Seed companies had increased costs for producing private hybrids over
public hybrids, and over open pollinated varieties. We calculated the increased net
income of seed ﬁrms and of farmers from the sale and use of private hybrids,
rather than public hybrids, as the total beneﬁts of private research. For hybrid
sorghum, the seed companies captured at most 18.5% of the beneﬁts as higher net
income, while 81.5% of beneﬁts went to farmers (the value of increased
production minus the increased cost of seed). For hybrid pearl millet, seed ﬁrms
captured only about 6% of beneﬁts. More than 90% of the beneﬁts from private
pearl millet research went to farmers.
A recent study of the maize seed industry (Singh and Morris, 1997) contains
evidence that supports the conclusions of the earlier pearl millet and sorghum
study. ICAR and CIMMYT designed and carried out a survey of 480 farmers in
six states from 1994 through 1995. They found that hybrid maize yields were
higher than open pollinated varieties by about 1 metric ton per ha. Most of these
hybrids are private, and private hybrids have seed prices that are six times the
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price of maize grain and the price of open pollinated varieties of seed, and 20kg/ha
as the planting rate, the increased cost of seed will be Rs.560/ha. The increased
value of output is about Rs.2800, out of which Rs.560 has to be subtracted for
increased cost of seed. In addition, small amounts should be subtracted for
increased costs for fertilizer and perhaps herbicide. Clearly, the seed ﬁrms are not
capturing all the beneﬁts from adoption of the private hybrids, and farmers, along
with fertilizer and herbicide suppliers, are getting most of the beneﬁts. It is also
important to remember that the increase in seed prices is not pure proﬁt for the
seed ﬁrm because it now has to pay for R&D, processing, transportation, and
quality control. To the extent that maize prices are pushed down by farmers’
increased productivity, consumers rather than seed ﬁrms will be the main
beneﬁciaries of using private hybrid maize seed.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SEED INDUSTRY
Policy reforms have so far increased competition and research in the seed
industry. There are more ﬁrms in the seed industry. Seed sales are less
concentrated. Policy changes have also increased the amount of research by
foreign owned ﬁrms and by local ﬁrms. The article also provides evidence that the
greater ability of ﬁrms to capture beneﬁts from their research through hybrids, the
greater the research. This suggests that stronger legal protection of intellectual
property would also increase private research. In addition, new technological
opportunities based on biotechnology and public plant breeding research contrib-
uted to the growth in private research in India.
The second major ﬁnding of this article is that farmers in some of the poorest
regions of India capture the beneﬁts from private research. Our regression results
show that private research has a positive impact on yields of crops in the semi-arid
tropics. Data from our 1988 survey and research by CIMMYT indicate that
farmers, rather than seed companies, get most of the beneﬁts from these new
hybrids, despite the higher prices of seeds.
We believe that the policy implications of the analysis in this article for India
and for other developing countries are as follows:
• Reduce the regulatory barriers to investment and trade by large local ﬁrms and
foreign ﬁrms in the agricultural input markets. This increases competition based
both on product quality, as well as research and prices. The gains could be
especially great in countries such as China that are still closed to foreign seed
ﬁrms.
• Reduce regulations with which governments try to choose the most efﬁcient
technologies for farmers—such as mandatory government testing of varieties to
ensure that they are higher yielding than current varieties—and focus govern-
Liberalization’s Impact on the Indian Seed Industry 419ment regulatory efforts on preventing negative externalities—for example, plant
quarantine to reduce disease. India has had voluntary registration of new
varieties and voluntary testing of these varieties throughout this period. This
policy, which allows ﬁrms to start selling their new varieties without going
through three or more years of government testing and bribery, could greatly
reduce the cost of research and the arbitrariness of the testing system in many
developing countries.
• Continue government investments in public goods and goods that have large
positive externalities. These include basic research in areas such as biotechnol-
ogy, and applied research such as plant breeding of crops, in which weak
intellectual property rights lead to suboptimal levels of private research.
• Stronger intellectual property rights on plant varieties and genes will lead to
more private research. Developing countries that continue to resist stronger
intellectual property rights—including India—are missing out on research that
can help their farmers.
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